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The International Law Commission’s (ILC) invaluable work has been the first
stepping-stone for the creation of many treaties. However, its work must not be
considered as a source for States’ obligations in itself. This is also true for the
Commission’s interpretations of existing rules of international law. Under this system,
and guided by the principle of sovereign equality, States can only be bound by either
their consent, validly expressed in a treaty, or by a practice constant and consistent
enough to be considered as a rule of custom. However, the international system
greatly benefits from efforts towards the codification and systematization of its rules.
The ILC’s quest for the progressive development of international law and its
codification
In 1947, the ILC was established by General Assembly Resolution 174 (II) —under
Article 13 (1)(a) of the Charter of the United Nations— to “initiate studies and make
recommendations for the purpose of encouraging the progressive development of
international law and its codification”. Much of the ILC’s work, including its activities
mandated under Article 24 of its Statute, has been concerned with identifying
customary international law to make it more readily available. As discussed in
Dr. Danae Azaria’s article, the ILC’s recent practice has comprised interpretative
pronouncements. Even though these pronouncements are intended to remain non-
binding, they may trigger an interpretative dialogue with States, which leads to a
commonly agreed understanding of specific topics of international law. This practice
gives rise to questions as to the real competencies that the Commission has in the
development of international law.
The ILC’s objective, as previously mentioned, is twofold: it comprises the promotion
of the progressive development of international law, on the one hand, and its
codification, on the other. Among them, the former refers to the preparation of draft
conventions on subjects that have not been regulated under international law or that
have not been sufficiently developed in the practice of States. Correspondingly, the
objective of the Commission’s work regarding codification refers to the formulation
and systematization of rules of international law in areas where there is extensive
State practice, precedent and doctrine.
The Commission’s work on crimes against humanity is an example of both
codification of custom and progressive development. The topic of crimes against
humanity has been the subject of numerous conferences held since it was included
at the sixty sixth session of the ILC in 2014, under the work of Special Rapporteur
Mr. Sean D. Murphy, leading to the adoption of a set of draft articles on prevention
and punishment of crimes against humanity.
Regardless of the questions that could arise for some States regarding the scope
of application, several States already have internal legislation addressing the issue
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of those crimes based on existing treaty obligations, such as those contained in the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. A rule of customary international
law exists when there is enough evidence of State practice and opinio juris, despite
it being or not classified as such by the Commission. Moreover, before the very
existence of the ILC, the International Court of Justice and its predecessor, the
Permanent Court of International Justice, already based their sentences on rules of
customary international law without any declaration awarding them said status.
Is “codification by interpretation” stretching the ILC’s mandate?
The powers of the ILC fall short of imposing obligations on States that have not given
their consent to that effect. Under the most fundamental principles of international
law, a State cannot be bound by a treaty to which it has not given its consent in a
valid way, in the terms provided by the treaty itself. It follows that the rules contained
in the works of the ILC only come to effect – if ever – when a treaty on their basis
is concluded validly. It appears relevant at this point to discuss how the ILC’s work
commonly relates to treaty law. Rather than interpreting the primary rules that
govern the relations between States, the ILC seems to have historically approached
conventional law by codifying and promoting the development of the rules that allow
for the functionality and coherence of the system.
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), often referred to
as a “treaty on treaties”, contains a series of relevant dispositions regarding
their application and interpretation. The well-known general rule of interpretation
enshrined in Article 31 VCLT does not provide for a specific understanding of any
rule whatsoever. Instead, it codifies an already existing rule of customary character,
which was subsequently adopted by the Vienna Conference and entered into force
as a treaty.
Another noteworthy example from the ILC’s work are the 2001 Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA). Adopted
by the ILC at its fifty-third session and submitted to the United Nations General
Assembly, the Articles have not yet been concluded in the form of a legally-binding
treaty. Therefore, they do not constitute a source of international law, but rather a
systematized and coherent expression of what the ILC has found to be enough State
practice and opinio juris in respect to the scope of the Articles. Of course, the non-
binding character of the ARSIWA does not preclude their content from being valid
obligations – via customary international law.
As stated in the ILC’s general commentary to the Articles, their nature is that of a
secondary rule: they do not seek to interpret the content of primary international
obligations, a power that remains within the competency of States and International
Organizations. The question of when an obligation has been breached —whatever
that means in the context of the particular rule— is a consideration that falls outside
of the aim of the Articles and the mandate of the Commission. The ILC works mainly
as a counsel to States for the adoption of rules of international law, whether by
codification of customary rules or by progressive development of new ones. The
interpretations made by the Commission lack an authoritative character, but that
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does not mean that they cannot serve as guidelines for States in their international
relations.
The mandate of the ILC to engage in the progressive development and codification
of international law is not exempt of undertones: its work is to initiate studies and
make recommendations to that effect, and thus it does not have any competency
to create law. Its proposals of guidelines, articles and, most relevant to the present
entry, interpretations, are not binding and authoritative upon States. Furthermore,
the Commission’s powers of interpretation are delimited by its mandate: they can
go only as far as needed to advance the development of international law and its
codification.
It seems natural that, given the close collaboration between the ILC and the
international community — most notably via the UN General Assembly — the works
of the former foster certain discussions in which States engage at different levels.
However, this does not mean that States and international bodies are relegated from
their competency to interpret and apply treaty rules. The adoption of international
instruments, whether or not based on the recommendations of the International Law
Commission, remains a prerogative of States in exercise of their sovereignty.
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